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Abstract  
Many studies have found that the exit rate from unemployment increases in the 
vicinity of the exhaustion day of unemployment insurance benefits. The extent to 
which this spike is driven by job search behavior is important for assessing the 
distortionary effect of unemployment insurance. Card, Chetty and Weber 
(American Economic Review 2007; 97: 113–118) find a large spike in the exit 
rate from registered unemployment but only a very small spike in the job finding 
rate in Austria. We replicate their analysis using matched register data for 
Finland. We find a large spike also in the job finding rate at the time of benefit 
exhaustion, even though it is clearly smaller than the spike in the exit rate from 
unemployment benefits. In addition, we demonstrate difficulties in measuring the 
time to benefit exhaustion when the benefit entitlement can elapse at a reduced 
rate during activation measures or part-time working. Unless the remaining 
benefit entitlement is directly observed in the data, the resulting measurement 
error can lead to downward biased estimates of the spikes at benefit exhaustion.  
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1 Introduction
One common ﬁnding in the empirical literature on unemployment insurance (UI) is a
notable increase in the number of people leaving unemployment just when their beneﬁts
are about to expire (e.g. Moﬃtt, 1985, Katz and Meyer, 1990, Card et al., 2007, and
Geerdsen et al., 2017). The spike in the exit rate from beneﬁt receipt or from registered
unemployment around beneﬁt exhaustion is typically more pronounced than the spike in
the job ﬁnding rate (Card et al., 2007). The latter spike can be viewed as evidence of the
distortionary eﬀect of UI as it suggests that some unemployed wait until their beneﬁts
expire before they return to work.1 The size of the observed spikes varies across studies,
reﬂecting diﬀerences in institutions (e.g. the maximum beneﬁt duration and availability
of other beneﬁts after UI beneﬁts have expired), how the unemployment spell is deﬁned
(the duration of beneﬁt receipt, the duration of registered unemployment or the time to
next job), and data quality (recall errors in survey data, truncated unemployment data
when only UI records are available, whether job entries are directly observed or not, and
measurement errors in potential beneﬁt duration).
Card et al. (2007) review the previous evidence and provide new results on the shape
of the hazard functions around beneﬁt exhaustion using rich register data for Austria.
They ﬁnd a large spike in the exit rate of registered unemployment at beneﬁt exhaustion
but only a modest spike in the job ﬁnding rate. Using hazard model estimates they show
that less than 1% of non-employment spells are manipulated to end around the time of
beneﬁt exhaustion. The diﬀerence in the spikes in the unemployment exit and job ﬁnding
rates suggests that many unemployed register at the public employment service only to
gain beneﬁt eligibility. As such, the spike in the unemployment exit rate should not be
interpreted as evidence of the moral hazard eﬀect of UI as has been done in some previous
studies. The researchers should instead focus on quantifying the size of the spike in the
job ﬁnding rate around beneﬁt exhaustion.
The aim of this paper is to replicate the analysis of Card et al. (2007) using matched
register data for Finland. The Finnish beneﬁt scheme is similar to the Austrian one in
that the UI beneﬁts are paid up to a certain maximum duration, after which a lower
means-tested unemployment assistance is provided indeﬁnitely. However, the maximum
1Direct evidence on that type of behavior is provided by Krueger and Mueller (2010) who analyze
time use survey data from the U.S. and ﬁnd that the time spent in job search increases prior to beneﬁt
exhaustion among UI recipients and declines after beneﬁts are exhausted. Boone and van Ours (2012)
develop a search model where job applicants and ﬁrms can agree on a delay in job starting which produces
the spike in the job ﬁnding rate at beneﬁt exhaustion. They also present empirical evidence to support
this prediction using data for Slovenia. DellaVigna et al. (2016) propose an alternative search model
with reference-dependent preferences, where unemployed workers reduce their search eﬀort after beneﬁt
exhaustion once they get used to the lower beneﬁt level. They show that the model can capture the spike
at beneﬁt exhaustion in the Hungarian data.
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duration of UI beneﬁts is much longer in Finland (100 weeks compared to 20 or 30 weeks
in Austria) while the level of the secondary beneﬁt is lower.
Our data combines information from several administrative registers. We can make a
distinction between exits to new jobs, recalls to previous employers, and exits to subsidi-
zed employment. An exceptional feature of our data is that we can measure accurately the
length of the remaining entitlement period over the course of the unemployment spell.
This is important because the beneﬁt entitlement did not elapse during labor market
training programs until 2009, and it elapses at a reduced rate when the beneﬁt level is
temporarily adjusted due to earnings from part-time work. As a result, the maximum
number of days on UI beneﬁts (and equivalent beneﬁts) can exceed the maximum du-
ration of UI beneﬁts which is deﬁned for the full beneﬁt level, and the diﬀerence in the
length of these two periods varies across individuals depending on their behavior. This
institutional feature is not speciﬁc to Finland but applies to many other countries as well.2
If the resulting measurement problem is ignored, the spike in the job ﬁnding rate at be-
neﬁt exhaustion will be underestimated and the level of the job ﬁnding rate after beneﬁt
exhaustion will be overestimated. It is also important to make a distinction between job
ﬁndings (reﬂecting job search choices by unemployed workers) and exits to subsidized em-
ployment (reﬂecting allocation decisions by employment authorities). This is because job
placement programs are often targeted at those unemployed who have already exhausted
their beneﬁts or whose beneﬁts are about to expire.
When the time to beneﬁt exhaustion is accurately measured and exits to job placement
programs are not treated as job ﬁndings, our results show that the job ﬁnding rate starts
to increase two months prior to beneﬁt exhaustion and peaks sharply in the last week
of beneﬁt eligibility, after which its drops below the pre-spike level. Although the spike
in the job ﬁnding rate at beneﬁt exhaustion is much larger than the one found by Card
et al. (2007) for Austria, our results are quantitatively similar in the sense that only a
tiny share of non-employment spells are manipulated to terminate close to the end of the
entitlement period.
2Speciﬁc training beneﬁts are paid to UI recipients who participate in labor market programs for
example in Norway (Gaure et al., 2012) and Sweden (Richardson and van den Berg, 2013). Such beneﬁts
are also paid in Austria, but Card et al. (2007) use data on unemployment spells from the years 19812001
when the active labor market policy did not yet play an important role in Austria. Part-time working on
UI beneﬁts prolongs beneﬁt periods for example in France (Le Barbanchon, 2016) and the U.S. (McCall,
1996) but not in Austria.
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2 Institutional setting3
To be eligible for unemployment compensation the claimant must be registered as an
unemployed job seeker at the public employment service (PES). Members of unemploy-
ment funds with suﬃcient employment history qualify for 100 weeks of UI beneﬁts (500
weekdays). This employment condition is met if the claimant had been working and
making membership payments for 34 weeks within the past 28 months (43 weeks within
24 months before 2003) prior to the unemployment spell. Those who do not satisfy the
employment condition can claim unused UI beneﬁts from the previous unemployment
spell. The beneﬁt level is determined by the average wage over the review period of the
employment condition. Unlike in most other countries, there is no cap in the beneﬁt level,
but the replacement rate declines rapidly with the past wage rate. Those who exhaust
their UI beneﬁts can claim a ﬂat-rate labor market subsidy which is means-tested but
available for an indeﬁnite period for those in need.4
Prior to 2010, a speciﬁc training subsidy was paid to unemployed workers who par-
ticipated in labor market training programs. The amount of the subsidy was equal to
the unemployment beneﬁt the worker would have otherwise been entitled to. In 2010,
the training subsidy was abolished. Since then the program participants have received UI
beneﬁts. Before the 2010 reform, participation in the training program postponed bene-
ﬁt exhaustion by the length of the program period, in which case the maximum beneﬁt
duration exceeded 100 weeks (given that the training subsidy was equal to the UI beneﬁt).
Those who take up a full-time job for less than two weeks (four weeks before 2003) or
a part-time job may be entitled to partial UI beneﬁts. Monthly income from such jobs
reduces the UI beneﬁt level by 50% of the earned amount. Workers on partial UI beneﬁts
are expected to continue their search for regular full-time employment in exchange for the
beneﬁts. During periods of partial beneﬁts, the beneﬁt entitlement elapses at a reduced
rate corresponding to the ratio of the partial beneﬁt level to the equivalent full beneﬁt
level.
To sum up, the length of the initial UI entitlement period at the start of unemploy-
ment spell varies between 1 and 100 weeks (or, more precisely, between 1 and 500 days)
depending on the past employment history and the amount of unused UI beneﬁts from
past unemployment spells. We exploit this variation to separate the eﬀect of the time
3The description of the beneﬁt rules applies to the years 20002013 which is the period covered by our
empirical analysis. For a discussion of the current rules and changes over time see Kyyrä et al. (2017).
4The unemployed who are not members of the unemployment fund but satisfy the employment-history
condition are eligible for a ﬂat-rate basic unemployment allowance up to 100 weeks. This beneﬁt is the
same amount as the labor market subsidy but it is not means tested. In practice, this beneﬁt type is of
minor importance as the vast majority of workers are members of unemployment funds (in 2015, 90% of
employed workers).
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to beneﬁt exhaustion from duration dependence. Moreover, even though the maximum
beneﬁt duration is 100 weeks, a worker can collect beneﬁts longer if he or she receives
partial beneﬁts or participates in labor market training programs. This suggests that
the initial beneﬁt duration at the beginning of the spell minus the elapsed duration of
registered unemployment, beneﬁt receipt or non-employment are all noisy measures of
the length of the remaining beneﬁt entitlement. To deal with this measurement problem
we exploit exceptionally rich data in which the remaining beneﬁt entitlement is directly
observed over time.
3 Data
One data source is the registers of the Ministry of Employment and the Economy which
cover all individuals who are registered as job seekers at the PES. All unemployment
beneﬁt recipients are included as the registration is a prerequisite for beneﬁt receipt.
This data set provides information on job search spells and participation in labor market
training and job placement programs, as well as demographic characteristics of job seekers.
However, the data does not contain any information on receipt of unemployment beneﬁts,
nor on regular job spells.
The UI beneﬁts are paid by unemployment funds, but each fund reports the beneﬁts it
paid out to the Insurance Supervisory Authority on a quarterly basis. From this authority
we obtain data on UI beneﬁts and earnings-related training subsidies. Along with daily
beneﬁts the records also include counters of the claimed full-time equivalent beneﬁt days
at the end of each quarter. With this information we can keep track of the number of days
until the UI beneﬁt will expire. From the Social Security Institution we obtain data on
ﬂat-rate beneﬁts. Finally, we merge employment and earnings records from the Finnish
Centre for Pensions, which is a statutory co-operation body of all providers of earnings-
related pensions in Finland that keeps comprehensive records on job spells and earnings
for the entire population (including also self-employed and civil servants).
We deﬁne the spell of unemployment as the time the worker collects unemployment-
related beneﬁts. More precisely, we combine sequential spells of beneﬁt receipt whose
distance is no longer than four weeks by treating such beneﬁt periods as part of the same
unemployment spell but ignoring the days without beneﬁts between the beneﬁt periods.5
The time spent in labor market training programs is counted as part of the unemployment
spell, as in Card et al. (2007). The resulting unemployment spell may thus include periods
5Although the beneﬁts are paid for ﬁve days a week, we count the weekends as part of the beneﬁt
period. As such, the beneﬁt period is deﬁned as the time from the ﬁrst day of beneﬁt receipt to the last
day of beneﬁt receipt, and such periods are then combined if they are close enough without including the
gaps between them.
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on diﬀerent types of beneﬁts. For example, a worker may ﬁrst receive UI beneﬁts, then
the training subsidy for the duration of a labor market training course, and ﬁnally end
up on the labor market subsidy after exhausting his or her UI beneﬁts.
The unemployment spell may end with a transition to regular work, job placement pro-
gram (i.e. subsidized work) or non-participation. We treat subsidized work as a distinct
exit destination to distinguish the behavior of unemployed job seekers from the decisions
of the employment authorities. This is important because job placement programs are
often targeted at those whose beneﬁts are about to expire. Card et al. (2007) focus on
exits to regular employment, i.e. they do not consider exits to wage subsidy programs
as job ﬁndings (such programs were rare in Austria during the period covered by their
analysis).
The data from the PES also include information on exits to regular jobs that the appli-
cants found themselves or through the referrals of the employment authorities. However,
this information is incomplete as the exit reason is often missing for those who found a
new job on their own.6 For this reason, job ﬁndings are detected by comparing the ending
dates of the unemployment spells and the starting dates of the employment spells. The
employment records also include an identiﬁcation code of the employer for each job spell,
which we use to distinguish recalls to the previous job from exits to new jobs.
We use data on unemployment spells that started with receipt of full-time UI beneﬁts
in 20002013 after a job loss. We require that the duration of the previous job was no less
than four weeks, the wage of the job was at least 500 Euros (in 2013 Euros) a month, and
the job ended within four weeks prior to the beneﬁt claim. The last condition eliminates
voluntary quits which lead to a waiting period of three months, as well as temporary
layoﬀs during which the employment contract remains in eﬀect. We further limit our
analysis to individuals between the ages of 20 and 54. Given that our data records are
complete until the end of 2013, we censor spells that were in progress on December 31,
2013.
The ﬁnal sample contains 769,989 unemployment spells for 373,439 individuals.7 In
6UI recipients (labor market subsidy recipients) claim their beneﬁts in four-week periods from the
unemployment fund (Social Security Institution). When the unemployed worker ﬁnds a job or leaves the
labor force, he or she simply stops making beneﬁt claims. Otherwise the worker has to pay back the
unjustiﬁed beneﬁt payments which we do observe in our data. On the other hand, the job seekers have
no strong incentive to inform the employment authorities about the change in their labor market status
(although the registration at the PES was the prerequisite for receipt of the ﬁrst beneﬁt payment) but
they may simply stop keeping in touch with the employment authorities, in which case their registered
unemployment spell at the PES will be terminated with some delay. A consequence is that the ending
date of the registered unemployment spell is unreliable for some of the unemployed. For this reason we
focus on the duration of beneﬁt receipt, not on the duration of registered unemployment as in Card et al.
(2007).
7We also drop a small fraction of spells with some peculiarities in the beneﬁt records. These include
6,900 spells during which full-time equivalent UI beneﬁts were received over 100 weeks, which should not
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56% of the cases, the individual met the employment condition and was thus awarded
a new 100-week period of UI beneﬁts at the beginning of the spell. Nonetheless, the
average length of the entitlement period is as long as 89 weeks, suggesting that most
of those who did not meet the employment condition had experienced a short UI spell
in the past. Most of the unemployment spells are quite short: 51% of the spells ended
within three months, 73% within six months, and 88% within a year. The median and
average unemployment duration are 13 and 24 weeks, respectively. Despite the much
longer beneﬁt periods in Finland, these spells are only slightly longer on average than
the unemployment spells in the Austrian data. Most of the spells ended with a return to
employment (71%), whereas exits to job placement programs (7%) and non-participation
(12%) are less frequent outcomes.8
4 Results
Figure 1 depicts the weekly exit rate from unemployment for a sub-sample of those who
met the employment condition and were thus eligible for the maximum beneﬁt duration of
100 weeks at the beginning of the spell (431,101 spells). The peaks in the exit rate around
two and six months are driven by recalls, i.e. exits to the same employer for which the
individual worked before becoming unemployed (note that we dropped temporarily laid
oﬀ workers with a valid employment contract from the sample). More importantly, at 100
weeks the unemployment exit rate exhibits a large spike that is 2.3 times the average exit
rate in weeks 7180 (pre-spike level hereafter). There is also a spike in the job ﬁnding
rate that is 1.7 times the pre-spike level. Compared to the estimates of Card et al. (2007)
for Austria, the spike in the unemployment exit rate at beneﬁt exhaustion is of the same
magnitude. However, the spike in the job ﬁnding rate is larger but sharper as it lasts only
for one week; in the Austrian case, the job ﬁnding rate increases by 15% in the week of
beneﬁt exhaustion and by 20% for the next two weeks, amounting to a somewhat smaller
cumulative eﬀect over the 3-week period than the sharp 1-week spike in the Finnish data.
The spikes at beneﬁt exhaustion in ﬁgure 1 underestimate the true spikes for two
reasons. First, the 100th week of unemployment corresponds to the last week of UI
eligibility only for those individuals who did not participate in labor market training,
be possible. If these spells were included in the analysis with the duration of UI beneﬁts top-coded at
100 weeks, the spikes in the exit rates in the last week of beneﬁt eligibility would be somewhat higher
than those reported below. Thus, if anything, our results about the size of beneﬁt-exhaustion spikes are
conservative.
8To be classiﬁed as re-employed we require that the worker found a job that lasted for at least four
weeks. This means that those who took up a shorter job and did not return to unemployment beneﬁts
within four weeks are classiﬁed as unclear exits. Likewise, the spells that ended in December 2013
are treated as unclear exits because our follow-up period is too short to determine the exit destination
reliably in these cases.
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Figure 1: Unemployment exit and job ﬁnding rates as a function of time spent in unem-
ployment for those entitled to 100 weeks of UI beneﬁts at the beginning of the spell
nor collected partial UI beneﬁts. For the past training program participants the beneﬁts
do not expire after 100 weeks of unemployment but at a later point due to receipt of
a training subsidy (which was abolished in 2010), smoothing the spike observed in the
data. Working part time on partial UI beneﬁts postpones the exhaustion day in the same
way. Of those who are still unemployed after 99 weeks 14.3% have participated in a labor
market training program and 2.2% have received partial beneﬁts by that time.
Second, only a small fraction of UI recipients stay continuously unemployed for almost
two years; 95% of individuals have already left unemployment before the spike. Unem-
ployed workers often take up a short job and then return into unemployment. If such a
job is too short to lead to renewal of the entitlement period, the worker can claim his or
her unused UI beneﬁts from the previous unemployment spell. If we follow the common
practice and only include new UI spells in the analysis, most of the observations around
beneﬁt exhaustion will be discarded.
Figure 2 shows the exit rates for all spells that started with receipt of UI beneﬁts,
that is, we also include the spells in which the UI entitlement period at the beginning
is less than 100 weeks. In this sample, the relationship between the elapsed duration of
unemployment and remaining entitlement period is much weaker. The horizontal axis in
the graph does not represent the elapsed duration of the current unemployment spell but
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Figure 2: Unemployment exit and job ﬁnding rates as a function of time-to-exhaustion for
all those entitled to UI beneﬁts at the beginning of the spell (1 week of beneﬁt entitlement
= 5 full-time UI days)
the time to beneﬁt exhaustion. The negative values indicate the weeks spent on labor
market subsidy after beneﬁt exhaustion. Both exit rates are roughly ﬂat over the last
1030 weeks of beneﬁt entitlement but start to increase about 10 weeks prior to beneﬁt
exhaustion. The spikes in the last week of beneﬁt eligibility are roughly twice of the
corresponding spikes at the 100th week of unemployment in ﬁgure 1: 4.3 and 3.3 times
the pre-spike level (the average hazard rate 2130 weeks prior to beneﬁt exhaustion) for
the unemployment exit rate and job ﬁnding rate, respectively. Moreover, the job ﬁnding
rate drops sharply once UI beneﬁts have expired, ending up at an one third lower level
than before the spike. It is evident that the traditional way of plotting the hazard
functions in ﬁgure 1 fails to capture the shape of the exit rates around beneﬁt exhaustion
in the context of the Finnish data.
In ﬁgure 3 the overall unemployment exit rate is decomposed into exit rates to four
diﬀerent destinations. The spike in the exit rate to new jobs is somewhat larger than that
to old jobs (3.6 versus 2.9 times the pre-spike level, respectively). In the ﬁrst 10 weeks
following beneﬁt exhaustion the recall rate to the old job drops by over 40% whereas the
exit rate to new jobs declines clearly less, by about 20%. The exit rates to subsidized
employment and non-participation in the last week of beneﬁt eligibility are 5.8 and 7.7
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times the pre-spike level. During the ﬁrst 10 weeks after the exhaustion of UI beneﬁts, the
exit rate to subsidized employment is some 160% above the pre-spike level. By contrast,
the exit rate to non-participation is at a 20% lower level. Had we made no distinction
between exits to regular employment and exits to job placement programs, the spike in
the re-employment hazard in the last week of beneﬁt eligibility would have been 3.8 times
the pre-spike level (compared to 3.3 times the pre-spike level in ﬁgure 2) and there would
have been no decline in the hazard rate after beneﬁt exhaustion but a small increase of
7% over the ﬁrst 10 weeks.
To quantify the size of the spike around beneﬁt exhaustion in more detail, we estimate
proportional hazard models of the following form
h (t |b(t), X(t)) = λ(t) exp {f (b(t)) +X(t)β} ,
where t is the elapsed duration of unemployment (i.e. the number of the days received
unemployment beneﬁts, including weekends), λ (t) is the baseline hazard function that
captures the duration dependence, f (b(t)) is a function of the time-to-exhaustion (i.e.
weeks of the remaining beneﬁt entitlement or the weeks spent on labor market subsidy
after the exhaustion of UI beneﬁts) at unemployment duration t, and X(t) is a vector
of control variables. We estimate the model for overall unemployment exits as well as
for exits to diﬀerent destinations using the data on all spells that started with receipt
of full-time UI beneﬁts (i.e. the data used for the hazard rates in ﬁgures 2 and 3). We
censor a few very long spells at 140 weeks. To approximate the unknown baseline hazard
in a non-parametric fashion we use a piece-wise constant function for λ which is allowed
to vary freely across 4-week duration intervals.
We follow Card et al. (2007) and specify f as a set of dummy variables for the time-
to-exhaustion. We choose 2130 weeks of beneﬁt entitlement as a reference category
representing the pre-spike hazard level. The eﬀect of elapsed unemployment duration and
remaining beneﬁt entitlement, λ and f, are separately identiﬁed due to two sources of
variation. First, the length of the initial entitlement period b(0) varies across individu-
als. In other words, we exploit the fact that those UI recipients who do not satisfy the
employment condition are only entitled to unused UI beneﬁts from the previous spell.
Second, the elapsed unemployment duration t does not change parallel with remaining
beneﬁt entitlement b(t) all the time because b(t) was constant during the labor market
training programs before 2010, and because it elapses at a lower rate when the beneﬁt
level is reduced due to part-time working.
We report results from two speciﬁcations: one that only controls for the length of
the initial entitlement period at the start of the unemployment spell b(0) (using a set
of dummies for 10-week categories), and another with a number of additional covariates
11
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for gender, age, education, occupation, the duration and wage of the previous job, the
sector of the previous employer, the time spent employed 01 years ago and 12 years
ago, the year and month of the unemployment entry, and the time-varying indicators
for the current participants of labor market training programs and for those receiving
partial UI beneﬁts. Although these models are unlikely to capture the causal eﬀect of
potential beneﬁt duration,9 we can distinguish the time-to-exhaustion eﬀect from the
duration dependence, which is the topic of the paper.
Table 1 shows the estimates of the coeﬃcients of the time-to-exhaustion dummies as
proportional eﬀects on the reference level of the hazard function 2130 weeks before beneﬁt
exhaustion (i.e. exponents of the coeﬃcients). The estimates from the two speciﬁcations
are very similar, albeit the size of the spike in the last week of beneﬁt eligibility is typically
slightly smaller in the speciﬁcation with the large number of control variables. Overall,
the results are broadly in line with the visual evidence in ﬁgures 2 and 3 where we did not
control for the eﬀect of the duration dependence. In the following discussion, we focus on
the hazard estimates from the model with the control variables. As seen in column 2, the
unemployment exit rate starts to increase 1316 weeks prior to beneﬁt exhaustion. This
is due to increasing exits to job placement programs and non-participation (columns 10
and 12), whereas the job ﬁnding rate remains stable longer and starts to increase only 58
weeks before beneﬁt exhaustion (column 4). The new job hazard and the recall hazard
exhibit very similar patterns, both before and after beneﬁt exhaustion (columns 6 and 8).
From column 6 we see that the spike in the job ﬁnding rate in the last week of beneﬁt
eligibility is 3.1 times the pre-spike level. The spikes in the exit rates to job placement
programs and non-participation are much larger, 6.0 and 10.4 times the pre-spike level
respectively (columns 10 and 12). However, since these exit routes are less common than
regular employment, the spike in the overall unemployment exit rate  4.5 times the pre-
spike level (column 2)  is not much larger than the spike in the job ﬁnding rate. That is,
unlike in the Austrian case, the increase in the job ﬁnding rate plays an important role in
9In fact, part of the variation in b(0) can be regarded as exogenous. Kyyrä et al. (2017) ﬁnd no
evidence that workers in the Finnish labor market would time their unemployment entry according to
the employment condition rules, suggesting that there is random variation in potential beneﬁt duration
at the time of unemployment entry among workers whose past employment history is just above or below
the employment condition threshold (i.e. regression-discontinuity type of variation). Moreover, since
the threshold value of the employment condition was shortened in 2003, workers with 3442 weeks of
employment history during the past two years, who satisﬁed the new condition but not the old one, are
entitled to beneﬁts for diﬀerent duration depending the year of unemployment entry (i.e. diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences type of variation). However, it is diﬃcult to construct an accurate measure of the past
employment weeks of the employment condition because not all employment are counted for and because
the review period of two years may be extended for various reasons. As such, the causal inference using
either regression-discontinuity or diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences type of variation in potential beneﬁt duration
would probably call for the instrumental variables methods which are not easily implemented in the
context of hazard models.
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explaining the spike in the unemployment exit rate in the Finnish labor market. Except
for the exit rate to job placement programs, all the exit rates drop by at least 50% in
the week after beneﬁt exhaustion. Over the ﬁrst 212 weeks after beneﬁt exhaustion, the
unemployment exit rate is some 1020% above the pre-spike level. This is explained by
elevated exit rates to job placement programs and non-participation, as the job ﬁnding
rate remains at a somewhat lower level than before the spike.
Compared to the ﬁndings of Card et al. (2007), the spike in the unemployment exit
rate at beneﬁt exhaustion in Finland is roughly twice of the spike in Austria (4.5 vs. 2.4
times the pre-spike level). However, the diﬀerence in the spikes in the job ﬁnding rates is
much larger (3.1 vs. 1.2 times the pre-spike level). Card et al. (2007) ﬁnd that the exit
rates are ﬂat until the last week of beneﬁt eligibility, and then remain elevated for two
weeks in the case of the job ﬁnding rate and twelve weeks in the case of the unemployment
exit rate once the beneﬁts have expired. By contrast, we ﬁnd that the exit rates increase
several weeks before the end of the entitlement period, as predicted by job search models
(e.g. Mortensen, 1977). After beneﬁt exhaustion, the unemployment exit rate shows a
similar pattern to the Austrian case but the job ﬁnding rate drops below the pre-spike
level rather than remaining at a higher level. To some extent these diﬀerences between
the studies arise from the diﬀerent measures of the spell length: the duration of beneﬁt
receipt (until next job) for Finland vs. the duration of registered unemployment and the
time between job spells for Austria. The waiting period before the beneﬁt payments start
and a possible delay between the last beneﬁt payment and the start of the next job can
aﬀect the location of the spike by a few weeks. Nevertheless, it is evident that the job
ﬁnding rate increases more strongly around the time of beneﬁt exhaustion and explains
a larger part of the overall increase in unemployment exits in Finland than in Austria.
But this does not necessarily mean that the strategic timing of job starts to coincide with
beneﬁt exhaustion is a qualitatively important phenomenon even in Finland.
Using their hazard model estimates Card et al. (2007) estimate that less than 1% of
non-employment spells end in the last week of beneﬁt eligibility or in the following four
weeks due to the spike in the job ﬁnding rate. Another reason for the small role of the
spike is that most of the spells terminated before the end of the beneﬁt entitlement period
(80% in Austria). This is a relevant point also in our case: because of the exceptionally
long entitlement period in Finland, only 7% of the spells were still in progress during the
last 8 weeks of beneﬁt entitlement, which is the time interval when the job ﬁnding rate is
elevated. In light of this observation, it is not surprising that only 1.3% of the spells ended
with a transition into employment during the last 8 weeks of the entitlement period, and
0.3% of the spells in the last beneﬁt week. It follows that the spike in the job ﬁnding
rate close to beneﬁt exhaustion cannot have a large eﬀect on the average unemployment
14
duration despite its large size.
To address this question more closely we compute the counterfactual job ﬁnding hazard
over the last 8 weeks of beneﬁt entitlement by setting the job ﬁnding rate at its reference
level, i.e. the level 2130 weeks prior to beneﬁt exhaustion (we scale the weekly job
ﬁnding rates by hazard ratios shown in column 4 of table 1). Keeping the exit rates to job
placement programs and non-participation at their true levels, this exercise implies that
0.9% of the spells would have ended with a transition to employment during the last 8
weeks of beneﬁt entitlement in the absence of increases in the job ﬁnding rate over the last
weeks of the entitlement period. Stated diﬀerently, an extra 0.4% of the unemployment
spells end in the last 8 weeks of beneﬁt entitlement because of the strategical timing of
job starts.
5 Conclusions
We found a large spike in the exit rate out of UI beneﬁts just before the beneﬁts are
about to expire. A notable part of this spike is attributed to transitions to employment,
which indicate that some unemployed wait until their beneﬁts expire before they take up
a new job or return to their previous employer. The size of this group compared to the
entire population of UI recipients is however very small, and thereby the eﬀect of their
behavior on the average unemployment duration is negligible. This conclusion is in line
with the ﬁndings of Card et al. (2007) for Austria, although the mechanism is slightly
diﬀerent. We found a much higher increase in the job ﬁnding rate around the time of
beneﬁt exhaustion but its eﬀect is mitigated by a smaller fraction of the population still
unemployed close to the end of the entitlement period, which is not surprising given the
much longer entitlement period in Finland.
Moreover, our analysis also illustrates that, depending on the institutional setting,
quantifying the spike in the job ﬁnding hazard at the time of beneﬁt exhaustion may be
diﬃcult due to measurement problems, and it may call for matched register data with
detailed beneﬁt records in addition to data on employment spells.
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